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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
ORDER
v.

Appellate Case No. 20040516-CA

Joquin Bello-Catalan,
Defendant and Appellant

Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.
By reason of the failure of Appellee to file Appellee's
brief within the time permitted by Utah R. App. P. 26(a), which
time expired on February 23, 2005, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
case will be submitted to the court on Appellant's brief only;
provided, however, that if Appellee's brief is submitted within
seven (7) days from the date hereof, such brief will be accepted
for submission without further order of the court.
Dated this O

day of March, 2005,

FOR THE COURT:

•sf. ?
William A. Thorne, Jr., 'Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20030751-CA

vs.
SCOTT D. OAKEY,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings and

conclusion? "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 1 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (citations
omitted). Because this case was tried before the trial court without a jury, the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence is automatically preserved. Id. at \ 9, n.4.
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2.

In the alternative that this issue was not preserved, whether the trial court

committed plain error in finding Bello-Catalan guilty of child abuse, a class B
misdemeanor? To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of
the crime charged...." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71, 117, 10 P.3d 346. An
unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that ...
'plain error' occurred." Id. at % 11 (citations omitted).
3.

Alternatively, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a

directed verdict? When a claim of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal,
the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah
App. 1998) (citation omitted).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Joaquin Bello-Catalan appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of
the Fourth District Court after being convicted of child abuse, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(3)(b).
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Joaquin Bello-Catalan was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial
District Court on or about April _ <, 2u02 ^ iLii ciiiid abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in

the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §
76-5-109.l(2)(c); and assauh -M- p.iestic violence) in the presence of a child, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation oi v iah i w u t Annotated £ , (> ^ , J : a;.o >

^

Bench trial was held on May ! 7 2004 (R. 28; R. 41). At trial, the State made a
motion to amend COUP- I. dhild abuse, to reckless conduct - child abuse, a class B
misdemeanor (R. ^ # •* -*
Catdiu<

-
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- -c trial court granted the motion (R 2 ) ) Belle
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Bello-Catalan was sentenced to a term of 24 days in jail, credit granted for time
served, and he was placed on pronation w.\ o mourns >K

)

()] • , J i ; i ' ; Il 5 . 20 0 1 B< ;1 h :> G il .a 1; in filed < 1.1 imel> Notice of Appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment entered in the above
case (R. 35).

ST 4 TFATFNT O F RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Christy Sandoval

Christy Sandoval testified that she lives in a six-plex and Joaquin Bello-Catalan
his her neighbor and lives on the other side of the building (R. 41: 7-8). On April 23,
2004, around 9:00 a.m., Bello-Catalan called Sandoval and asked if she would baby-sit
his children because "he was going to have a couple of beers [and] didn't want the
children there" (R. 41: 8). Bello-Catalan then brought his two children, Flora and
Rosa, over to Sandoval's residence (R. 41: 9). Rosa was three or four months old (R.
41: 10).
Rosa is the youngest and Sandoval testified that Rosa had no injuries that she
was aware of (R. 41: 10). Sandoval watched the children until some time past noon (R.
41: 10). Nothing unusual happened while she watched the children and the children did
not suffer any accidents while in her home (R. 41: 10).
At some point while Sandoval was watching the children, she went to BelloCatalan's house to get a car seat (R. 41: 11). Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan asleep on the
couch (R. 41: 11). The house was "a little messy" with some beer cans and a few toys
on the floor (R. 41: 11-12).
The State showed Sandoval Exhibit #3, which is a picture of how Bello-Catalan's
living room appeared after the police arrived (R. 41: 12). The picture showed a little
guitar that was broken in "many pieces" (R. 41: 12). Sandoval testified that the little
guitar was broken with the back off when she went over there, but "it wasn't in that
many pieces" (R. 41: 12, 17).
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Around 2:00 p.m., Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan's wife driving towards the house
(R. 41: 13). She got the children ready and began to take them back and then heard
Bello-Catalan's wife yelling at him (R. 41: 13). Sandoval reached the corner of the
building, but then decided to go back to her house because of the yelling (R. 41: 14).
A few minutes later, Bello-Catalan's wife came over and took her children back (R. 41:
15). Sandoval could tell that she was "frustrated and angry" (R. 41: 15). Sandoval did
not notice any marks or injuries on Bello-Catalan's wife (R. 41: 15).
Testimony of Shaun Bell
Shaun Bell has been employed with the Utah County Sheriffs Office for 13
years (R. 41: 20). On the afternoon of April 23, 2004, Bell was called to the apartment
complex where Bello-Catalan lived (R. 41: 21).
When Bell arrived, he could hear yelling from inside the residence and also a
child screaming (R. 41: 22). Bell knocked on the door, announced himself as a peace
officer, and ordered them to open the door (R. 41: 22). Bello-Catalan opened the door
(R. 41: 22). Bell noticed that Bello-Catalan's eyes were bloodshot and Bell could smell
alcohol on his breath (R. 41: 22).
Bell ordered Bello-Catalan in English and Spanish to "come outside," but he did
not move (R. 41: 22). Bell then grabbed his arm and took him down to the ground and
placed handcuffs on Bello-Catalan (R. 41: 22). Bell then entered the residence and
found Bello-Catalan's wife and two children inside (R. 41: 23). One child was several
months old and the other was three or four years old (R. 41: 23). Bell noticed that
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"there were things smashed about the residence (R. 41: 23). There was a "broken
miniature guitar, beer cans scattered about, [and] some baby formula that had been
spilled" (R. 41: 24). There was also a bottle of liquor that had been thrown down on
the floor in the bathroom (R. 41: 24).
Bell photographed the scene and also photographed Bello-Catalan's wife and
child (R. 41: 24-26). Bell testified that the wife had "a large goose egg on her head
that was swollen and bruised at the time" (R. 41: 25). Bell also saw that the children
were crying and that "the youngest baby had a red mark on its face" (R. 41: 26). The
red mark "was just above the eye and it appeared like it was just a round spot" (R. 41:
27). Bell admitted that the red spot "didn't show up very well [and] I couldn't get my
camera to get an actual photograph of it. It didn't show up." (R. 41: 27). Bell was
unable to get a picture of the child with a red mark on her face (R. 41: 36-37). The
other child had no marks on her body (R. 41: 27). Bello-Catalan had "a small scratch
on his arm" (R. 41: 27).
Bell further testified that the wife's mark "appeared like it was turning dark and
the swelling was going up. There was no yellowish or any type of color to indicate that
it had been an older injury." (R. 41: 31). Bell also testified that Bello-Catalan
maintained that he did nothing to injure his wife or child and that it was his wife that
assaulted him (R. 41: 33, 36, 38).
Stipulation of Evidence

6

Both parties stipulated that Officer Marie Provstogaard observed four people in
the apartment (R. 41: 40).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Joaquin Bello-Catalan asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
that he inflicted any physical injury upon his child in a reckless manner. The only
evidence the State presented relative to this charge was Christy Sandoval's testimony
that the child was not injured when she baby sat her and that a short time later, Officer
Bell observed a red spot on the child's forehead. Because the evidence was clearly
insufficient to support the child abuse charge, the trial court committed plain error in
finding Bello-Catalan guilty of child abuse.
If this issue was not preserved below, Bello-Catalan asserts the trial court
committed plain error by finding him guilty, or in the alternative, his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on all the charges.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Bello-Catalan's conviction for child
abuse.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THAT BELLO-CATALAN PHYSICALLY INJURED
HIS CHILD OR ALLOWED ANOTHER PERSON TO INJURE HIS
CHILD

Bello-Catalan asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
recklessly injured his child in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(3)(b). All
the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the verdict, is against the clear weight
of evidence.
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 1f 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (citations omitted).
"However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder]
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (citation omitted).
"The burden on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy.
Defendant 'must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of
fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Larsen, 2000 UT
App 106 at f 11 (citation omitted).
The marshaled evidence that allegedly supports Bello-Catalan's conviction is as
follows:
8

Christy Sandoval, Bello-Catalan's neighbor, agreed to baby-sit Bello-Catalan's
two children on the morning of April 23, 2004, so Bello-Catalan could drink (R. 41: 78, 9). When Sandoval began watching them, neither child was injured in any manner
that she was aware of (R. 41: 10). A few hours later, Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan
asleep on the couch (R. 41: 11). There were beer cans and toys on the floor, including
a miniature guitar that had its back broken off (R. 41: 11-12, 17).
After Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan's wife coming home, she heard his wife
yelling at him (R. 41: 12-13). Bello-Catalan's wife then came and took the kids and at
the time, neither the two kids nor the wife had any apparent injuries (R. 41: 15).
Apparently some time after the police arrived, Sandoval saw the miniature guitar and it
was broken in many pieces (R. 41: 12).
The officer that arrived at the scene, Shaun Bell, testified that when he first
arrived, he heard a male and female arguing in a heated manner and a child crying (R.
41: 22). He ordered Bello-Catalan out of the house and noticed that he had been
drinking (R. 41: 22). After handcuffing Bello-Catalan, Bell entered the house and saw
that it was messy, with beer cans on the floor, spilled baby formula, and a broken
miniature guitar on the floor (R. 41: 23-24). Bell also saw that Bello-Catalan's wife
was injured, with a "large goose egg on her head that was swollen and bruised at the
time" (R. 41: 25). Bell also saw that the children were crying and that "the youngest
baby had a red mark on its face" (R. 41: 26). The red mark "was just above the eye
and it appeared like it was just a round spot" (R. 41: 27).
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Bell took pictures of both the wife and youngest child (R. 41: 24-26). The
wife's injury showed up on the picture (R. 41: 25). However, the red spot on the child
"didn't show up very well" (R. 41: 27). For some reason, the "round spot" just above
the child's eye did not show up on the picture (R. 41: 36-37).
Bello-Catalan asserts that this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings, is insufficient to support the conviction. After correctly finding
reasonable doubt pertaining to the charges of commission of domestic violence in the
presence of a child, and assault (domestic violence) in the presence of a child, the trial
court found "the child did appear uninjured when she was being baby sat, a very short
time later she had a red mark on her. She was upset and crying when the officer
investigated." (R. 41: 49). The trial court then erroneously concluded, "I believe that
that charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 41: 49).
Bello-Catalan asserts that the facts in this case are not disputed. However, the
trial court's findings are against the clear weight of evidence. Utah Code Annotated §
76-5-109(3)(b) provides:
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a
child is guilty of an offense as follows: (b) if done recklessly, the offense is a
class B misdemeanor....
The only evidence that possibly supports the trial court's findings is the fact that when
the child was baby sat by Sandoval, she appeared uninjured (R. 41: 10). A short time
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later, the child had a red mark on her face just above her eye and she was crying (R.
41: 22,26).
The State presented absolutely no evidence that Bello-Catalan caused the child's
red mark on her face or that he permitted another person to inflict the red spot on the
child. There was no eyewitness testimony that alluded to Bello-Catalan inflicting the
red spot, nor was there any circumstantial evidence alluding to Bello-Catalan inflicting
the red spot on his child. The mere fact that Bello-Catalan had been drinking, that his
wife was yelling at him and that she somehow injured her head, that there were beer
cans and a broken miniature guitar on the floor, and that the child had a red mark on
her head and she was crying is not sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bello-Catalan inflicted the red mark above his child's eye.
This evidence presents a few possibilities of what might have happened;
however, there is insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bello-Catalan physically injured his child. The most likely scenario is that the child
bumped her head on something. This would have been a minor accident, since the
bump left only a "red mark" or a "round spot" that would not even show up on a
camera picture when Officer Bell took a picture of it (R. 41: 26, 27). This is the most
likely scenario because the evidence presents no hint or suggestion that Bello-Catalan
caused the round spot.
There is simply no evidence to support the trial court's erroneous conclusion.
Therefore, Bello-Catalan's conviction should be reversed.
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II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT
PROPERLY PRESERVED, THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED
IN FINDING BELLO-CATALAN GUILTY WHEN THE EVIDENCE
WAS INSUFFICIENT

In the instance that this Court finds that the insufficiency issue was not properly
preserved below, Bello-Catalan asserts that the trial court plainly erred by finding him
guilty, or alternatively, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
directed verdict on all charges. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed.
A.

The Trial Court Plainly Erred by Finding Bello-Catalan Guilty of
Child Abuse.

An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can
demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71, t i l , 10
P.3d 346 (citations omitted). To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency
claim, "a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction of the crime charged...." Id. \ll.

"To demonstrate that the evidence is

insufficient ..., the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 114, 989 P.2d
1065 (citation omitted). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when,
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the ... verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant
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committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at \ 18
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)).
As shown above in Point I, the marshaled evidence, and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's findings and
conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court committed plain error in finding Bello-Catalan
guilty.
B.

Alternatively, Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict
on All Counts Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss a
charge for insufficient evidence "succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient
to support a conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision);
See also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, \ 21, n.2, 61 P.3d 1062; Tillman v. Cook,
855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to
dismiss the evidence to convict was sufficient)).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1 P.3d 546 (citation omitted).

13

As shown above, the State failed to produce any evidence that Bello-Catalan
injured his child in any manner. Moreover, the trial court dismissed the last two
charges for insufficient evidence. Accordingly, trial counsel's performance was
deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict on all charges. But for this failure,
Bello-Catalan would not have been convicted of child abuse.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Bello-Catalan asks this Court to reverse his
conviction for child abuse, a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J_

day of January, 2005.

/l^^tnPf/
Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, t h i s / S day of
January, 2005.

^
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ADDENDA

76-5-107.5

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-5-107.5. Prohibition of "hazing" — Definitions —
Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of hazing if that person intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly commits an act or causes another to
commit an act that:
(a) (i) endangers the mental or physical health or
safety of another; or
(ii) involves any brutality of a physical nature such
as whipping, beating, branding, calisthenics, bruising, electric shocking, placing of a harmful substance
on the body, or exposure to the elements; or
(iii) involves consumption of any food, liquor, drug,
or other substance or any other physical activity t h a t
endangers the mental or physical health and safety of
a n individual; or
(iv) involves any activity t h a t would subject the
individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep
deprivation, extended isolation from social contact, or
conduct t h a t subjects another to extreme embarrassment, shame, or humiliation; or
(v) involves cruelty to any animal as provided in
Section 76-9-301; and
(b) (i) is for the purpose of initiation, admission into,
affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition for
continued membership in any organization; or
(ii) if the actor knew t h a t the victim is a member of
or candidate for membership with a school team or
school organization to which the actor belongs or did
belong within the preceding two years.
(2) It is not a defense to prosecution of hazing t h a t a person
under 21, against whom the hazing was directed, consented to
or acquiesced in the hazing activity.
(3) An actor who hazes another is guilty of a:
(a) class C misdemeanor if the conduct violates Section
76-9-301;
(b) class B misdemeanor if there are no aggravating
circumstances;
(c) class A misdemeanor if the act involves the operation or other use of a motor vehicle;
(d) third degree felony if the act involves the use of a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(e) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious
bodily injury to a person; or
(f) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection
(3)(e) involves the use of a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601.
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in
reporting of an alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or
criminal liability regarding the reporting.
(5) (a) This section does not apply to military training or
other official military activities.
(b) Military conduct is governed by Title 39, Chapter 6,
U t a h Code of Military Justice.
(6) (a) A prosecution under this section does not bar a
prosecution of the actor for:
(i) any other offense for which the actor may be
liable as a party for conduct committed by the person
hazed; or
(ii) any offense, caused in the course of the hazing,
that the actor commits against the person who is
hazed.
(b) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) a person may be separately punished, both for the hazing offense and the
conduct committed by the person hazed.
(c) Under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) a person may not be
punished both for hazing and for the other offense, but
shall be punished for the offense carrying the greater
maximum penalty.
1997

320

76-5-108.

P r o t e c t i v e orders restraining a b u s e of another — Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject
to a protective order, child protective order, ex parte protective
order, or ex parte child protective order issued under Title 30
Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a'
Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant
Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly
violates t h a t order after having been properly served, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be
provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
76-5-109. Child a b u s e .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a h u m a n being who is under 18 years
of age.
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical
injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d).
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's
health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional h a r m to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing t h e child's head to impact with an object or
surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the same
time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay,
or retardation, or severe impairment of the chid*
ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disflg*
urement or protracted loss or impairment of tne
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to ceas
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful fol^v
ing the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes
child's life.
,
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious pbysl
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a c
is guilty of an offense as follows:
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(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of t h e second degree,
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third
degree, or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor,
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor, or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class C misdemeanor
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, m lieu of
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent
shall not, for t h a t reason alone, be deemed to have committed
an offense under this section
2000
76-5-109.1. C o m m i s s i o n of d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e i n t h e
p r e s e n c e of a child.
(1) As used m this section
(a) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as defined m
Section 30-6-1
(b) "Domestic violence" h a s the same meaning as in
Section 77-36-1
(c) "In the presence of a child" means
(I) in t h e physical presence of a child, or
(II) having knowledge that a child is present and
may see or hear an act of domestic violence
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if the person
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide,
as defined m Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the
presence of a child, or
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in
Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the
presence of a child, or
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits an act of domestic
violence in t h e presence of a child
(3) (a) A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is
guilty of a third degree felony
(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(c) is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor
(4) A charge u n d e r this section is separate and distinct
^from, and is m addition to, a charge of domestic violence where
-the victim is the cohabitant Either or both charges may be
-filed by the prosecutor
2002
'"•5-110. A b u s e or n e g l e c t of d i s a b l e d child.
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Abuse" means
(1) inflicting physical injury, as t h a t term is defined
in Section 76-5-109,
(11^ having the care or custody of a disabled child,
causing or permitting another to inflict physical injury, as t h a t term is defined in Section 76-5-109, or
(III) unreasonable confinement
(b) "Caretaker" means
(I) any parent, legal guardian, or other person
having under his care and custody a disabled child, or
(II) any person, corporation, or public institution
that has assumed by contract or court order the
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re sponsibihty to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical, and other necessities to a disabled child
(c) 'Disabled child" means any person under 18 years of
age who is impaired because of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, or other cause, to
the extent t h a t he is unable to care for his own personal
safety or to provide necessities such as food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care
(d) 'Neglect" means failure by a caretaker to provide
care, r utrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical
care
(2) Any caretaker who abuses or neglects a disabled child is
guilty of a third degree felony
(3) (a) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, m
lieu of medical treatment, m accordance with the tenets
and practices of an established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal guardian is a member
or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be considered
to be lr violation under this section
(b) I h e exception under Subsection (3)(a) shall not
preclude a court from ordering medical services from a
physici an hcensed to engage m the practice of medicine to
be provided to the child where there is substantial risk of
h a r m to the child's health or welfare
1997
76-5-111.

Abuse, n e g l e c t , or e x p l o i t a t i o n of a vulnerable adult — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Abandonment" means a knowing or intentional
action or inaction, including desertion, by a person or
entity acting as a caretaker for a vulnerable adult t h a t
leaves the vulnerable adult without the means or ability
to o b t a n necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical or
other he alth care
(b) "Abuse" means
(it attempting to cause harm, intentionally or
knovvmgly causing harm, or intentionally or knowingly placing another in fear of imminent harm,
(n) causing physical injury by knowing or intentional acts or omissions,
(m) unreasonable or inappropriate use of physical
restraint, medication, or isolation that causes or is
likely to cause h a r m to a vulnerable adult that is in
conflict with a physician's orders or used as an
unauthorized substitute for treatment, unless that
conduct furthers the health and safety of the adult, or
(i\) deprivation of life sustaining treatment, except
(A) as provided in Title 75, Chapter 2, P a r t 11,
Personal Choice and Living Will Act, or
(B) when informed consent, as defined in this
section, has been obtained
(c) "Business relationship" means a relationship between two or more individuals or entities where there
exists an oral or written agreement for the exchange of
goods or services
(d) "Caretaker" means any person, entity, corporation,
or public institution t h a t assumes the responsibility to
provide a vulnerable adult with care, food, shelter, clothing, supervision, medical or other health care, or other
necessities "Caretaker" includes a relative by blood or
marriage a household member, a person who is employed
or who provides volunteer work, or a person who contracts
or is unde r court order to provide care
(e) "Deception" means
(1) a misrepresentation or concealment
(A) of a material fact relating to services rendered, disposition of property, or use of property
mtended to benefit a vulnerable adult,

